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This paper introduces credit market imperfections and barriers to entrepreneurship into
the Ramsey growth model. It is assumed that only a small elite, the oligarchs, may run
firms and that these oligarchs - when borrowing from workers - may renege on the debt
contracts at low cost. In such an economy, poor contract enforcement slows down the
transition towards the steady state and alters the dynamics of the distribution strongly in
favor of the oligarchs. The reason is that the workers are forced to charge ”low” borrowing
rates in order to decrease the incumbents’ incentives to default. With dynastic preferences,
low returns reduce the workers’ propensity to save; they discount future wages less and
consume more out of current income. Calibrations of the model suggest that the elite’s
welfare gains are large - even if the oligarchic structure were associated with substantially
lower productivity growth rates. These findings point to political forces behind low financial
development.
JEL classification: O11, O16, K42
Keywords: creditor rights, asset distribution, economic development
∗University of Zurich, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Bluemlisalpstrasse 10, CH-8006 Zu¨rich,
Tel: +41 1 634 36 09, Fax: +41 1 634 49 07, e-mail: oechslin@iew.unizh.ch.
†The author thanks Ernst Fehr, Reto Fo¨llmi, Mark Gradstein, Klaus Reiner Schenk-Hoppe´, Anja Shortland
and Josef Zweimu¨ller for helpful comments.
1
1 Introduction
Recently, macroeconomists have shown considerable interest in the eﬀect of an imperfect credit
market on the long-run distribution of wealth (e.g., Piketty, 1997; Matsuyama, 2000) and on
the economy’s growth rate (e.g., Be´nabou, 1996). While the models contributing to this
literature diﬀer from each other in several dimensions, they share one common feature. In
each period, the individuals consume a constant fraction out of their current income. Such an
ad-hoc consumption rule can be optimal if, for instance, a time period is interpreted as exactly
one generation and individuals derive utility from consumption and bequest to the oﬀspring.
In this paper, we analyze the impact of credit market imperfections when parents take account
of the welfare of their children. Then, as shown by Barro (1974), individuals with finite lives
behave as a household with an infinite horizon so that today’s optimal consumption depends
not only on current income but also on future returns to accumulation and future wage rates.
To understand the role of an imperfect credit market when the individuals have an infinite
horizon, consider the following stylized economy with two key features. First, to keep the
analysis tractable, only a small economic elite, the ”oligarchs,” may run firms in the capital-
intensive sector of the economy. Entry from non-members - we will denote them by ”workers”
- is de facto prohibited because of, for instance, costly licensing of new business. Hence, as far
as the workers accumulate capital, they have to lend to oligarchs in order to earn a positive
return on their savings. Second, the credit market is imperfect in the sense that the borrowers
can only borrow up to a finite amount at a given rate. The credit limit exists because credit
contracts are not well enforced; the sanctions against default by oligarchs are imperfect.
An important implication of these two assumptions is that the equilibrium borrowing rate
lies below the marginal product of capital if the workers posses relatively much capital. The
reason is that a lower borrowing rate gives the oligarchs weaker incentives to default and
increases their borrowing capacity. A large borrowing capacity allows the oligarchs to absorb
the comparatively high credit supply by the workers; the latter, in turn, are prepared to lend
at a low rate because of the lack of an alternative use for their savings. Hence, in such a
situation, there is a spread between the workers’ and the oligarchs’ return to accumulation.
While the workers experience a low return, the oligarchs - having access to cheap credit - face
one that is higher than the marginal product of capital.
The fact that the workers’ return may be ”very low” generates a number of interesting
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comparative-dynamic results when individuals have dynastic preferences. First, the aggregate
capital stock is always smaller than in an otherwise identical first-best Ramsey economy that
starts with the same initial conditions. In other terms, given the aggregate capital stock, the
oligarchic economy grows more slowly at any point in time than the corresponding first-best
Ramsey economy. Second, the distribution of capital and current income is always more un-
even (as compared to the first-best economy) in the sense that the workers’ share in aggregate
capital or income is lower. The equalizing force generating over time a more even distribution
in the standard Ramsey world is dampened or entirely eliminated. Moreover, the steady state
distribution is the less equal the lower the degree of contract enforcement is. Third, the oli-
garchic economy has a less developed credit market than the first-best economy if development
is measured by the ratio aggregate credit divided by GDP. Poor contract enforcement keeps or
concentrates capital in the hands of those who may invest - and prevents the potential lenders
from saving much.
The mechanism behind these results is very intuitive. Low future returns to accumulation
increase, other things equal, the present value of labor income. With dynastic preferences,
current consumption rises in this variable. Hence, the workers’ propensity to save out of
current income is comparatively low with imperfect contract enforcement. Put diﬀerently,
the workers anticipate that they will be partially expropriated through low returns if they
accumulate too much. Therefore, they do not accumulate much; they simply consume a large
fraction out of their current income - and remain poor. Note that such a mechanism is absent
by construction if the individuals follow the above-mentioned ad-hoc consumption rule (as it
is typically the case in the literature) and/or if the interest rate is exogenous (as, for instance,
in Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Galor and Zeira, 1993, or Matsuyama, 2003).
It is further interesting to assess the welfare consequences poor creditor protection. Despite
the fact that the economy grows at a lower rate, the oligarchs are strictly better oﬀ than in
the corresponding first-best Ramsey economy. The reason is twofold. One the one hand, they
win because of ”cheap” access to credit. On the other hand, they are better oﬀ since capital,
their sole source of income, is ”scarcer” on the aggregate level at any point in time so that
their return to capital is higher. In contrast, the workers lose; they are not only hurt by the
low borrowing rates but also by the fact that the wages rise more slowly if the economy grows
at a lower pace. Of course, it has already been recognized in the literature that poor contract
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enforcement, if accompanied by barriers to entry, may benefit the established entrepreneurs
through low factor prices; in Banerjee and Newman (1993), for instance, the elite wins because
of low wage rates while redistribution operates through low borrowing rates in Matsuyama
(2000).1 However, this paper draws attention on the fact that the elite’s welfare gains are
very significant if the individuals have dynastic preferences; the reason is that the active
generation does not only take into account the current income gains but also the benefits that
will accrue to all future generations. Calibrations of the model suggest that the oligarchs would
be prepared to accept substantially lower (exogenous) productivity growth rates in exchange for
such ”bad” institutional arrangements. In other terms, the net benefit would even be positive
if the combination of a malfunctioning legal system and barriers to entry caused substantial
ineﬃciencies resulting in lower productivity growth rates.2
The welfare analysis points to the importance of political forces behind low financial de-
velopment. It identifies a potentially influential group in society that may be, as Rajan and
Zingales (2003) put it, ”opposed to something as economically beneficial as financial develop-
ment.” If the incumbents do not have to fear competition for credit from not yet established
entrepreneurs, they benefit from poor credit contract enforcement; the power to default at low
cost provides them with cheap access to credit in equilibrium. Hence, it may be in the interest
of the oligarchic elite to hold up an ineﬃcient legal system that gives rise to low credit market
development.
As pointed out above, for poor creditor protection to benefit the oligarchs it is crucial that
the talented non-members of the elite may not easily open a new business; if there were only
little obstacles to entrepreneurship, the non-members could simply employ their savings in an
own firm (or become borrowers themselves) rather than lend them at unfavorable terms. Thus,
a simple way to assess whether the political economy argument put forth above may be an
explanation for low credit market development is to look at the correlation between creditor
protection and the extent of entry regulation; the latter variable has recently been shown to
be an important obstacle to the creation of new firms (Klapper et al., 2004). A negative
1In Aghion and Bolton (1997), the ”middle-class” borrowers may benefit from a low interest rate. The reason
is that the firm sizes are fixed so that the wealth entrepreneurs are forced to become lenders.
2In reality, there are a number of reasons why lower productivity growth rates may come along with such
”bad” institutions. For instance, if entry into a specific sector is prohibited, there is little hope the incumbents
are the most talented entrepreneurs.
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association would indicate that poor creditor protection is more likely to be adopted if the
established entrepreneurs benefit, i.e., if the dynamics of the distribution is aﬀected. Using
diﬀerent measures for entry regulation and creditor protection, we find indeed strong evidence
in favor of such a correlation in a cross-section of countries - even if one controls for economic
development and legal origin.
This paper is most closely related to the literature on the dynamics of the distribution
among individuals with ex ante heterogeneous access to investment opportunities. Work by
Galor and Zeira (1993), Banerjee and Newman (1993), Aghion and Bolton (1997), and Piketty
(1997) has contributed to a better understanding under which circumstances initial disparities
will be amplified and, to the contrary, when inequality will decrease or even die out over time.
This question has also received much attention in recent papers by Matsuyama (2000, 2003).3
Among all these contributions, the present paper is most closely related to Matsuyama (2000);
it is assumed that the established entrepreneurs have access to a CRS technology so that
they benefit strongly when poor creditor protection keeps the equilibrium borrowing rate low.
However, the model developed here deviates from Matsuyama (2000) by introducing labor
as a factor of production and from the whole literature by assuming dynastic preferences;
the main point here is to show that there is - beyond diﬀerent returns to accumulation -
an additional channel through which wealth inequality may be amplified over time: poor
contract enforcement decreases the worker’s propensity to save out of current income. Other
closely related work includes Be´nabou (1996), the models presented in Aghion and Howitt
(1998, Chapter 9), and a recent paper by Castro et al. (2004). This strand of literature is
interested in the impact of credit market imperfections on economic growth when individuals
are heterogeneous with respect to wealth. As in the present model, credit market imperfections
may have a negative influence on the growth rate; however, while the literature emphasizes,
for instance, the role of heterogeneous investment returns or lower incentives to supply eﬀort,
the argument here is that imperfect creditor protection lowers the (workers’) incentives to
save.4 A further important diﬀerence to the second strand of literature is that credit market
3Matsuyama’s work oﬀers also an explanation for endogenous inequality, i.e., for how the distribution among
initially identical individuals may become unequal over time if the credit market is imperfect. Similarly, Freeman
(1996) and Mookherjee and Ray (2002, 2003) are interested in how the market mechanism can endogenously
create inequality.
4Castro et al. (2004) show that poor investor protection may actually increase the economy’s growth rate in
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imperfections - although leading to lower growth rates - are shown to have asymmetric eﬀects
on the welfare of diﬀerent groups in society. This insight oﬀers a political perspective on why
some countries have failed to develop a well-functioning credit market. Therefore, the present
paper is linked to Rajan and Zingales (2003) who point out that financial development may
work against the interest of the established large industrial firms. A similar argument can be
found in Beck et al. (2003). Based on the endowment theory put forth by Engerman and
Sokoloﬀ (1997) and Acemoglu et al. (2001), they suggest that poor creditor protection - giving
rise to low financial development - can be viewed as an ”extractive institution” that secures
rents for the elite. But while the contributions by Rajan and Zingales and by Beck et al.
emphasize the competition-enhancing eﬀects (on the product market) of financial development
in general, this paper argues that the lack of a key ingredient to financial development - the
enforcement of credit contracts - provides the economic elite with cheap access to credit.
On a broader level, this paper is related to the work by Bertola (1993), Alesina and Rodrik
(1994), and Persson and Tabellini (1994) who study policy choices, in particular taxes on
capital income, in heterogeneous agent models. These contributions suggest that the workers
have an incentive to impose high taxes on capital income - despite the fact that high taxes
decrease the growth rate. In this sense, the poorer redistribute from the richer and take into
account that the first-best policy is not implemented. In contrast, the present paper suggests
that ”bad” policies - while decreasing the economy’s growth rate - may be chosen not because
they benefit the poor but aﬄuent elite.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we show that barriers
to entrepreneurship - an important feature in our model - are highly relevant from an em-
pirical point of view. Section 3 sets up the basic model. In Section 4, we do comparative
dynamics. Moreover, the welfare implications of imperfect credit are qualitatively discussed
and quantitatively illustrated with a numerical example. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Entry Barriers and Financial Development
The distributional consequences of poor creditor protection to be derived below rest upon the
assumption of barriers to entrepreneurship. A talented worker may not too easily become an
Diamond’s overlapping generations framework: Poor creditor protection shifts income to the young generation
(the borrowers) and hence increases, all other things equal, aggregate savings.
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entrepreneur and employ his savings in an own - perhaps small - firm. Put diﬀerently, the
incumbents benefit only if a large part of the population is forced to lend to them because
entrepreneurship is a viable choice for the elite only. In reality, there is a large number of
potential entry barriers. Limited borrowing itself is an entry barrier if production requires
some minimum scale. A further (but complementary) obstacle is costly regulation of entry.
The literature suggests that extensive entry regulation is widespread - in particular in poor
countries. The purpose of this section is to review some of the evidence and to show that heavy
regulation of entry and poor creditor protection go often hand in hand.5
In an influential study on business regulation and corruption, De Soto (1989) reports that
in Peru in the early eighties a potential entrepreneur had to spend 289 days on 11 bureaucratic
procedures to comply with all the regulations. This is equivalent to a loss in net profits of $
1’231 (in 1983) which corresponds to more than one third of the per capita GDP in 1983. In a
systematic survey, Djankov et al. (2002) report similar or even higher barriers to entry (number
of bureaucratic procedures, time requirements, cost) in 1999 throughout the developing world.
An impressive example is Mozambique. In economic terms, the 19 procedures required there
translate into 149 business days and a cost of 111 % of the per capita GDP. This is a more
general pattern. The number of procedures is strongly correlated with both the time and the
cost requirements to obtain the legal status to operate a firm (Djankov et al., 2002, Table VI).
On average, the countries in the lowest quartile of per capita income require 12 procedures
and impose a cost (consisting of fees, legal stamps, and so on) amounting to 108 % of the
per capita GDP. Yet, the real burden is likely to be much higher than these oﬃcial costs.
Heavy regulation usually goes together with higher perceived corruption indicating that the
entrepreneurs are frequently asked for additional, irregular payments to obtain the required
permits and licenses (Djankov et al., 2002, Table V). It is obvious that such costly regulation of
entry prevents talented individuals from starting a new business. Most of them will not be able
to bring up enough capital to finance high administrative expenses and the initial investment
at the same time - in particular if borrowing is limited. This reasoning receives support from
a recent paper by Klapper et al. (2004) who show that entry regulation hampers the creation
of new firms even in Europe.
5Note that Rajan and Zingales (2003) have already presented some evidence suggesting that the extent of
entry regulation is negatively correlated with stock market development.
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It is further interesting to assess whether the countries with particularly high barriers
to entrepreneurship are also the countries in which creditor protection is poorest. Such a
correlation would be consistent with the view that financial development and entry barriers are
jointly determined in the political process to foster the incumbent entrepreneurs’ interests. The
discussion so far suggests that it is natural to take the (log) number of procedures (LN #PROC)
or, alternatively, the (log) cost as a share of per capita GDP (LN COST) as crude proxies
for entry barriers.6 To check the robustness of our results we use as a third measure the
business regulation index constructed for 1997 by the Heritage Foundation. The rescaled
index (BUSINESS REG) ranges from 1 to 5 with lower scores indicating that the regulation
in particular with respect to opening a new business is less burdensome. We also use three
alternative measures as proxies for the extent of creditor protection. First, we employ the
property rights index for 1999 compiled by the Heritage Foundation (PROPERTY RIGHTS)
that has also been used by Beck et al. (2003). The rescaled index ranges from 1 to 5, with
5 indicating that private contracts - credit contracts, for instance - are very well enforced.7
Second, we use new data provided by Djankov et al. (2005) on the number of days it takes to
enforce a simple debt contract through courts (DAYS).8 It seems reasonable to assume that
a higher number of days lowers the ability of an ordinary creditor to use the legal system in
order to resolve a dispute. Finally, a more indirect way to assess creditor protection is to look
at how developed the credit market is. It is argued in the literature (e.g., Beck et al., 2003) -
and it will be one of the predictions of our model - that poor creditor protection is mirrored
in low financial development as measured by the ratio credit to the private sector divided by
the GDP (PRIVAT CREDIT). The data comes from the World Development Indicators and
is calculated as an average over the nineties.
As further independent variables we use (log) per capita GDP (LN pcGDP; Djankov et al.,
2002) and dummies for the legal origin (La Porta et al., 1999). These controls are included
since they may aﬀect entry regulation and the dependent variable simultaneously. Richer coun-
6The cost includes the direct cost associated with meeting the governments requirements plus the monetized
value of the entrepreneur’s time (calculated as the product of time and the per capita GDP expressed in per
business day terms).
7More precisely, the index measures the degree to which government protects and enforces laws that protect
private property.
8The data describe the number of calendar days to enforce a contract of unpaid debt worth 50 % of the
country’s per capita GDP. For the exact methodology see Djankov et al. (2003).
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tries tend to have more complex and specialized economies. In such economies, the optimal
amount of resources spent on institutions protecting private property and facilitating eco-
nomic exchange may ceteris paribus be higher. Similarly, a more specialized economy is ceteris
paribus more likely to develop a liquid credit market. At the same time, the optimal extent of
regulation may be lower in richer countries because of less severe market failures. Legal origin
is included as a control in some regressions since, as argued by La Porta et al. (1999), it is
likely to be a important determinant of both the government’s willingness to intervene in the
economy and its attitude towards the security of property rights.9 Summary statistics for all
variables except legal origin are shown in Table 1.
All in all, we run 18 regressions to assess the relationship between creditor protection and
the extent of entry barriers. Each of the alternative dependent variables is regressed on the
three proposed proxies for entry barriers. In all the regressions, the (log) per capita GDP is
included as a control for economic development. Each regression equation is estimated with
and without the controls for legal origin. The results are presented in Table 2. The overall
picture supports the view that bad creditor protection goes hand in hand with heavy regulation
of entry (see also Figure 1 below). Higher barriers to entry are associated with a lower degree of
enforcement of laws protecting private property (regressions 1 - 6). Further, in countries with
higher barriers to entry, a creditor has to spend more days to enforce a simple debt contract
through courts (regressions 7 and 9 - 12). Finally, at least with LN COST or BUSINESS REG
as proxies for the entry barriers, heavier regulation of entry is associated with lower financial
development as measured by the ratio credit to private sector divided by the GDP (regressions
15 - 18).
Figure 1 here
Quantitatively, the correlation is strongest when creditor protection is measured by the dura-
tion of dispute resolution (DAY), perhaps the most appropriate proxy for creditor protection.
For instance, a 1-standard-deviation-increase in LN COST (roughly the diﬀerence between the
UK and Sweden) is associated with a 100-day-increase - the diﬀerence between the UK and
Thailand - in the duration of contract enforcement (which corresponds to 47 % of the standard
deviation in the dependent variable). Note further that in case of PROPERTY RIGHTS and
9With respect to legal origin, the countries are divided into five categories: English, French, German, Scan-
dinavian, and Socialist.
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PRIVATE CREDIT the (log) per capita GDP enters as expected. Richer countries put - all
other things equal - on average more emphasis on the enforcement of the law (protecting private
property) and tend to have a more liquid credit market. In contrast, there is no statistically
significant association between the duration of enforcement of credit contracts and the level of
economic development. Finally, all other things equal, legal origin seems not to play much of
a role in predicting creditor protection (results not reported).
The evidence so far suggests the following conclusion. A political process leading to signif-
icant barriers to entry is also likely to implement poor creditor protection, or vice versa. The
theory developed in the following sections oﬀers a potential explanation for this correlation.
It is the combination of entry regulation and bad creditor protection that leads to significant
redistribution towards the economic elite.
3 The Model
3.1 Technology and Social Structure
Technology. The economy is closed and comprises two sectors. First, there is a capital-
intensive sector that produces a (homogeneous) intermediate good. For simplicity, we assume
that the intermediate good is produced from capital alone. In particular, all firms operating
in this sector have access to a linear technology that allows to produce A
(1−α)/α
t units of the
intermediate good with one unit of capital. The aggregate production of the intermediate
good, denote it by Mt, is therefore given by
Mt = A
(1−α)/α
t Qt, (1)
where Qt is aggregate capital invested at date t. For the rest of this section, the productivity
parameter A is assumed to grow with the constant rate g. Later on, we will allow g to vary
with the industry structure or the level of financial development.
Second, final output is produced with intermediate goods and labor using a CRS production
technology that is the same for all firms. Let’s further assume that this production technology
is is of the Cobb-Douglas type so that the aggregate production of the final good, Yt, is given
by
Yt = L
1−αMαt , (2)
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where L denotes aggregate labor supply and 0 < α < 1. The final output can be used for
either consumption or investment. The rate of transformation of final output into capital is 1.
We take the price of the final good as the numeraire.10
Social structure and endowments. The population size is constant over time and
normalized to 1. The individuals diﬀer with respect to their endowments and their business
opportunities. There are two types of agents. An (exogenous) fraction θ ∈ (0, 1) of the
population consists of workers. Each worker is endowed with 1/θ units of (homogeneous)
labor, and the labor endowments are inelastically supplied on a competitive labor market.
The workers may also accumulate capital that serves as an input into the intermediate goods
sector. However, they may not run an own firm in this sector since entry is de facto prohibited
by, for instance, heavy administrative regulation or extensive corruption. As far as workers
accumulate capital, they can only act as lenders on a possibly imperfect but competitive credit
market (see below). The remaining individuals are called entrepreneurs.11 Each entrepreneur
runs an own firm in the capital-intensive intermediate goods sector and does not supply labor
but engages in managing the enterprise. We may think of these agents as members of an
influential oligarchic elite that has implemented the barriers preventing the non-members from
entering the sector. However, since a single capitalist is of measure zero with respect to the
whole capitalist class, the market for the intermediate good is competitive. The same applies
for the final goods market. Although not crucial to any of our results, it is most coherent to
think that the firms in the final goods sector are also owned by the capitalists.
Assume now that the individuals in the range [0, θ] are workers and those in the range (θ, 1]
are capitalists. Hence, the aggregate labor endowment, the workers’ aggregate capital stock,
and the entrepreneurs’ aggregate capital stock are given by L ≡
R θ
0 (1/θ)di = 1, K
L
t ≡
R θ
0 kitdi,
KEt ≡
R 1
θ kitdi, respectively, where kit denotes the capital stock owned by individual i at date
t. For simplicity, we abstract from heterogeneity within each group with respect to the initial
capital endowment. Since the individuals belonging to the same group are perfectly identical
in all other respects too, we have kit = K
L
t /θ if i ∈ [0, θ] and kit = KEt /(1 − θ) otherwise.
Note, finally, that the amount of capital invested by entrepreneur i at date t, qit, not necessarily
coincides with the stock of capital owned by capitalist i, kit, due to the possibility of borrowing
10The introduction of an intermediate goods sector greatly simplifies the exposition of the optimal firm
behavior and the characterization of the equilibrium under imperfect credit (see Subsection 3.2 below).
11In what follows, I use the terms ”entrepreneur,” ”oligarch,” and ”capitalist” interchangeably.
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from workers.
Since both the labor market and the market for the intermediate good are competitive,
the wage rate, wt, and the price of the intermediate good, pt, are given by their respective
marginal product. Thus, we have
wt = (1− α)Mαt and (3)
pt = αM
α−1
t .
Finally, because each capital unit produces A
(1−α)/α
t units of the intermediate good, the
marginal product of capital is given by ptA
(1−α)/α
t .
3.2 Credit Market
Credit relations and contract enforcement. The credit market is incomplete and imper-
fect in the following sense. There is only one possible type of credit contract. Capitalists may
borrow from workers on a competitive but imperfect credit market. The interest rate in t is
called Rt. The credit market is imperfect because a borrower may renege on the credit con-
tract. In particular, he can refuse to pay the interest debt by incurring some cost. Following
Matsuyama (2000), we assume that capitalist i loses a fraction λ ∈ (0, 1] of his gross income
ptA
(1−α)/α
t qit in case of default on the interest debt which is given by the amount of credit
times Rt.
12 Yet, as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), he has not to fear other sanctions like, for
instance, limited access to the credit market in the following periods. A λ close to 0 stands for
a very eﬃcient expropriation technology whereas a value close to 1 indicates strong creditor
protection. Henceforth, we refer to λ as the degree of legal protection of creditors. Given
these assumptions, a capitalist decides period by period whether to default or not, and he will
do so whenever he can improve his period income. We further assume that the lenders take
into account these incentives and give only credit up to an amount that makes the borrower
indiﬀerent between fulfilling the contract or reneging on the contract. It immediately follows
that the maximum amount of credit capitalist i gets is given by λptA
(1−α)/α
t qit/Rt. Thus,
capitalist i’s maximum firm size (as measured by the capital invested) can be calculated as
12A possible interpretation of this cost is that the lender can seize a fraction λ of the capitalist’s gross income
in the event of repudiation. Hence, λptA
(1−α)/α
t can be seen as the collateral oﬀered to secure the loan.
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qit = kit + λptA
(1−α)/α
t qit/Rt. Solving for qit yields
qit =
1
1−
³
λptA
(1−α)/α
t /Rt
´kit, i ∈ (θ, 1], (4)
where kit denotes the stock of capital owned by capitalist i. Equation (4) tells us that richer
entrepreneurs can borrow more. If Rt is larger than λ times the marginal product of capital,
as it will be the case in equilibrium, the maximum firm size is an aﬃne-linear function of
the entrepreneur’s wealth, kit. The reason is that, due to imperfect contract enforcement,
the entrepreneurs have to contribute 1 − λptA(1−α)/αt /Rt capital units per unit invested as a
down-payment.
What will be entrepreneur i’s optimal firm size (i.e., his optimal gross capital demand),
given restriction (4) and the price of the intermediate good? If the borrowing rate exceeds the
marginal product of capital, he will simply run a firm of size kit. Obviously, he will not go into
debt. On the other hand, he will not become a lender either since we have ruled out credit
contracts between entrepreneurs. If the borrowing rate is exactly equal to the marginal product
of capital, he will be prepared to employ any amount of capital in his firm while restriction (4)
limits the maximum firm size to (1− λ)−1 kit. Thus, the entrepreneur’s gross capital demand
may take any value on the interval [kit, (1− λ)−1 kit]. Finally, in case of Rt < ptA(1−α)/αt , he
would like to get an infinite amount of credit since he may appropriate a rent on each unit
borrowed. However, the incentive constraint (4) limits the maximum firm size to qit. This
upper bound increases as the borrowing rate goes down and approaches infinity as Rt goes to
λ times the marginal product of capital (see Figure 2 below).
Figure 2 here
Lowering the borrowing rate reduces, all other things equal, the benefits from breaking the
credit contract while the cost of doing so remains unchanged. This allows the entrepreneur to
seek additional credit without inducing him to renege on the interest debt.
Equilibrium borrowing rate. Let’s turn to the aggregate level. Aggregate gross cap-
ital supply in this economy is the sum of the workers’ aggregate capital stock, KLt , and the
entrepreneurs’ aggregate capital stock, KEt . Hence, aggregate gross capital supply at date t is
equal toKt ≡ KLt +KEt . Aggregate gross capital demand is the sum over the optimal firm sizes
characterized above. For a given price of the intermediate good, it equals KEt if the borrowing
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rate exceeds the marginal product of capital; it lies on the interval [KEt , (1− λ)−1KEt ] if Rt
is equal to the the marginal product of capital; finally, it is given by the aggregate borrow-
ing constraint
n
1−
³
λptA
(1−α)/α
t /Rt
´o−1
KEt if the borrowing rate lies below the marginal
product of capital (see Figure 3 below for a graphical representation of the demand schedule).
The equilibrium borrowing rate has to equate gross capital demand and gross capital sup-
ply. Thus, we have we have Rt = ptA
(1−α)/α
t if K
E
t ≤ Kt ≤ (1− λ)−1KEt (see Figure 3a).
Otherwise, if the inequality
λ <
KLt
Kt
≡ κt (5)
holds, aggregate gross capital demand would fall short of aggregate gross capital supply, Kt, if
the borrowing rate were equal to the marginal product of capital. Hence, the borrowing rate
has to be lower than the marginal product of capital in order to give the borrowers weaker
incentives to default. More precisely, we must have Rt = λptA
(1−α)/α
t /κt so that K
L
t can
exactly be absorbed by the entrepreneurs (see Figure 3b). To summarize, we have
rL (Kt/At,κt) = Rt =
⎧
⎨
⎩
λ
κt
ptA
(1−α)/α
t =
λ
κt
α (Kt/At)
α−1
ptA
(1−α)/α
t = α (Kt/At)
α−1
:
:
κt > λ
κt ≤ λ
, (6)
where rL denotes the workers’ return to capital. To derive the last two equalities in the above
equation we substitute for pt and account for the fact that the full aggregate capital stock in t
will be employed and hence Qt = Kt. Note, finally, that default will not occur in equilibrium.
The credit market is imperfect because it is possible to default.13
Figure 3 here
The fact that the workers face a return below the marginal product of capital if condi-
tion (5) holds is due to the combination of two key elements of the economy. First, only
entrepreneurs can productively employ capital, workers are excluded from entrepreneurial ac-
tivities by assumption. Put diﬀerently, the workers have to become lenders in order to earn a
positive return since they do not have an alternative use for their accumulated savings. Second,
the entrepreneurs have the power to default at relatively low cost if creditor protection is poor.
13The static equilibrium without an intermediate goods sector, i.e., if the final good were directly produced
with capital and labor, would be equivalent to the present equilibrium if punishment in case of default were a
fraction λ of the firm revenue minus wages.
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In equilibrium, this may force the lenders to charge low interest rates in order to allocate their
capital holdings productively. All other things equal, this is the more likely the higher the
workers’ share in aggregate capital is. Note, however, that the workers need not to own much
capital (in a relative sense) in order to face a return below the marginal product. If contract
enforcement is very bad, a tiny fraction suﬃces to have the borrowing rate below ptA
(1−α)/α
t .
Entrepreneurs’ rate of return. The entrepreneurs’ rate of return, denote it by rEt , can
now be calculated as follows. Suppose first that κt > λ so that the interest rate lies below the
marginal product of capital. Under these circumstances, the entrepreneurs seek the maximum
amount of credit and, consequently, run a firms of size qit. Entrepreneur i’s income is given by
his revenue minus the interest debt. Formally, entrepreneur i earns ptA
(1−α)/α
t qit−(qit−kit)Rt.
Substituting for qit (equation 4) and Rt (equation 6) greatly simplifies this expression:
Entrepreneur i’s income =
(1− λ)
(1− κt)
ptA
(1−α)/α
t kit, κt > λ.
Finally, to calculate the rate of return, we divide the entrepreneur’s period income by his
capital stock, kit. Thus, we have r
E
t = (1− λ)ptA
(1−α)/α
t /(1 − κt). Suppose now that κt ≤ λ.
In this case, of course, rEt equals the marginal product of capital. To summarize,
rE (Kt/At,κt) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1−λ
1−κt ptA
(1−α)/α
t =
1−λ
1−κtα (Kt/At)
α−1
ptA
(1−α)/α
t = α (Kt/At)
α−1
:
:
κt > λ
κt ≤ λ
. (7)
Equations (6) and (7) show that only in case of κt ≤ λ the returns to capital are equalized
between workers and entrepreneurs. Otherwise, if the borrowing rate lies below the marginal
product of capital, the entrepreneurs’ return exceeds the workers’ one. Put diﬀerently, if
κt > λ, there is a spread in the rate of return because an entrepreneur’s additional income
from a borrowed capital unit exceeds what he has to pay for this unit. In contrast to the
standard Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model, the individual returns here depend not only on the
level of the capital stock but also on its distribution.
3.3 Optimal Consumption and Aggregate Dynamics
This subsection solves the individuals’ consumption-savings decision and derives the equations
governing aggregate dynamics. To this end, we introduce the following definitions. We write
rLt ≡ rL (Kt/At,κt) and rEt ≡ rE (Kt/At,κt) if convenient. Moreover, a (b) over a variable
denotes the variable divided by A, the index of the state of technology. For example, we employ
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the definition bKt ≡ Kt/At and call bK the aggregate capital stock in eﬃciency units. Finally,
we substitute in equation (3) for Mt and write
wt ≡ w(At,Kt/At) = (1− α)At (Kt/At)α . (8)
Optimal individual consumption. All individuals derive utility from consumption of
the final good. They are assumed to divide the income in each period (as measured in units
of the final good) into consumption and savings in a way that maximizes the intertemporal
utility function
Ui =
∞X
t=0
µ
1
1 + ρ
¶t
ln cit, (9)
where ρ and cit denote, respectively, the rate of time preference and individual i’s consumption
at date t. Today’s savings contribute one-to-one to the capital stock of tomorrow such that
the individual stocks evolve according to
kit+1 = (1 + rit)kit + liwt − cit, (10)
where rit = r
L
t , li =
1
θ if i ∈ [0, θ] and rit = rEt , li = 0 otherwise. Since there is no uncertainty,
the individuals can perfectly forecast the future values of bKt and κt and, consequently, those
of rLt , r
E
t and wt. Then, optimal behavior implies that the law of motion for individual
consumption is given by the Euler equation
cit+1 =
1 + rit+1
1 + ρ
cit (11)
and that initial consumption, ci0, is chosen in a way satisfying the transversality condition
lim
T→∞
kiT+1QT
m=1 (1 + rit+m)
= 0.
Using the intertemporal budget constraint, it can be shown that consumption of worker i ∈
[0, θ] is given by
cit =
ρ
1 + ρ
¡
(1 + rLt )kit + ht
¢
, (12)
where ht =
P∞
j=0
³
(1 + rLt )wt+j
1
θ/
Qj
m=0
¡
1 + rLt+m
¢´
denotes the present value of the worker’s
labor endowment.14 Substituting for cit in equation (10) results in
kit+1 =
1 + rLt
1 + ρ
kit +
µ
1
θ
wt −
ρ
1 + ρ
ht
¶
. (13)
14Since the workers may not borrow it is implicitly assumed that a representative worker may follow this
optimal consumption rule without violating the (kit ≥ 0)-constraint. This is indeed the outcome of all the
simulations we have performed.
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The corresponding equations for an entrepreneurs i ∈ (θ, 1] are given by the particularly simple
policy functions
cit =
ρ
1 + ρ
(1 + rEt )kit and kit+1 =
1 + rEt
1 + ρ
kit. (14)
Note that, due to the log-preferences, the consumption behavior of the capitalists depends only
on the current state of the economy and is independent of the future evolution of Kt and κt.
Aggregate Dynamics. The specific micro-foundation of imperfect credit chosen in the
present paper makes the aggregation of individual variables highly tractable. Summing up
individual consumption levels (equations 12 and 14) and standardizing yields
bCt = ρ
1 + ρ
³³
1 + α bKα−1t ´ bKt + bHt´ , (15)
where bCt is aggregate consumption and
bHt = bwt + (1 + g) bwt+1¡
1 + rLt+1
¢ + (1 + g)2 bwt+2¡
1 + rLt+1
¢ ¡
1 + rLt+2
¢ + · · · (16)
denotes the present value of the aggregate labor endowment (both in eﬃciency units). Later
on, it will be helpful to know the law of motion of the latter variable. By manipulating equation
(16) we get
bHt+1(1 + g) = ³ bHt − bwt´ (1 + rLt+1). (17)
Note that the credit market imperfection may aﬀect aggregate consumption only through
future rates of return, rLt+1, r
L
t+2, r
L
t+3, · · ·, that influence the present value of labor income.
In particular, whenever κ exceeds λ in future periods, the workers’ rate of return lies below
the marginal product of capital while these values always coincide in case of a perfect credit
market. In contrast, the credit market imperfection has no influence on aggregate consumption
via redistributing current capital income. The reason is that the two groups adjust consumption
in response to such redistribution in an exactly oﬀsetting way.
Further, aggregating equation (10) across individuals and using the expression for aggregate
consumption (equation 15) allows us to derive the law of motion of bK as
bKt+1(1 + g) = 1
1 + ρ
bKt + 1 + ρ(1− α)
1 + ρ
bKαt − ρ1 + ρ bHt. (18)
Again, the credit market imperfection enters only through its impact on the present value of
labor income. For further use below, we rewrite this equation slightly. Solving equation (17)
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for bHt and using the resulting expression in equation (18) yields
bKt+1(1 + g) = 1
1 + ρ
bKt + 1
1 + ρ
bKαt − ρ1 + ρ bHt+1(1 + g)1 + rLt+1 . (18’)
The discussion so far suggests that, in case of a perfect credit market, the economy considered
here is formally equivalent to the (representative agent) textbook Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans
model. The introduction of both a protected intermediate goods sector and heterogeneity, if
not accompanied by poor contract enforcement, has no influence on the aggregate behavior
of the economy. Consequently, an economy with λ = 1 is called a first-best economy or,
equivalently, a benchmark economy.
4 Comparative Dynamics and the Steady State
This section compares the dynamics of aggregate capital and capital ownership under perfect
(λ = 1) and imperfect (λ < 1) credit, respectively, and explores the welfare implications of
poor creditor protection. To this end, we focus on two economies that diﬀer at date 0 only
in λ but are otherwise completely identical. In particular, the values of bK0 and κ0 are the
same. In addition, it is assumed that the first-best economy (λ = 1) grows from below towards
the steady state. Thus, for given initial conditions bK0 and κ0, we know that the first-best
economy converges to the corresponding (constant) steady state values bK∗ and κ∗1 ³ bK0,κ0´ ,
respectively. The notation makes transparent that, with λ = 1, the steady state distribution
of capital (but not the level) depends on the initial conditions.15
The first step in doing comparative dynamics is to keep track of κ, the workers’ share in
aggregate capital, in case of a perfect credit market (Subsection 4.1). Subsection 4.2 derives
the comparative-dynamic results and the welfare implications of poor creditor protection. Sub-
section 4.3 proves convergence to a steady-state also in case of λ < 1. Finally, in Subsection
4.4, the model is calibrated to quantify the impact of poor creditor protection.
15See Bertola, Foellmi, and Zweimueller (2005), Chapter 3.
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4.1 Behavior of the Benchmark Economy
To derive the behavior of κ in case of the benchmark economy (λ = 1), it is convenient to
calculate the steady state values of bK and r first. These values are given by
bK∗ = µ α
ρ+ g + ρg
¶ 1
1−α
and 1 + r∗ = (1 + ρ)(1 + g),
respectively. Moreover, the present value of labor income (in eﬃciency units) equals (1 +
ρ)ρ−1 bw∗ so thatHt and (1+r∗)Kt (as well as the aggregate output and aggregate consumption)
grow at the same rate, g, in steady state. Of course, this is consistent with the fact that κ is
a constant on the balanced growth path. The lemma below relates this constant to the initial
value, κ0. Note, however, that - although the economy converges to a particular value of κ -
any level of κ can be supported in a steady state.
Lemma 1 Let λ = 1. Then, we have κt < κ∗1
³ bK0,κ0´ for all t ≥ 0.
Proof. Suppose first that κ never falls and never stays unchanged during the transition
towards the steady state. Then, the claim immediately follows.
Suppose now that κ decreases or remains constant at least once. By aggregating equation
(14) across entrepreneurs and remembering equation (15) we can calculate the capitalists’ share
in aggregate consumption, CEt /Ct, as (1− κt)(1 + rt) bKt ³(1 + rt) bKt + bHt´−1 . From the Euler
equation, this ratio does not change over time since - in the first-best economy - the rate of
return is the same for workers and entrepreneurs. In particular, CEt /Ct takes the same value in
the transition towards the steady state as in the steady state. Hence, using 1+r∗ = (1+ρ)(1+g)
and bH∗ = (1 + ρ)ρ−1 bw∗, we get
CEt
Ct
= (1− κt)
(1 + rt) bKt
(1 + rt) bKt + bHt = (1− κ∗1)γ, (L1-1)
where
γ ≡ αρ(1 + gB)
ρ+ g(1 + ρ− α) .
Suppose now that κt+1 ≤ κt or, equivalently, that 1− κt+1 ≥ 1− κt. Then, since
(1− κt+1) = (1− κt)
(1 + rt) bKt
(1 + rt) bKt + (1 + ρ) bwt − ρ bHt ,
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we have (1 + ρ) bwt − ρ bHt ≤ 0 or, equivalently, bHt ≥ (1+ρ)ρ bwt. Using this inequality in equation
(L1-1) leaves us with
(1− κt)δ( bKt) ≥ (1− κ∗1)γ,
where
δ( bKt) = 1 + α bKα−1t
1 + α bKα−1t + (1 + ρ)ρ−1(1− α) bKα−1t .
Further, since bH∗ = (1+ ρ)ρ−1 bw∗, δ( bK∗) equals γ. Then, because δ0( bKt) > 0 for bKt < bK∗, we
have δ( bKt) < γ if bKt < bK∗. Hence,
(1− κt) > (1− κ∗1) or κ∗1 > κt.
Finally, assume that κ decreases (or remains constant) for the first time between τ ≥ 0 and
τ + 1. Then, κ∗1 > κτ ≥ κ0.
Lemma (1) is interesting beyond the subject of this paper because it allows to infer the
dynamics of capital ownership and current income in class societies. When (initially) a large
part of the capital stock is owned by a small elite and most individuals derive their income
almost exclusively from labor, the distribution of capital becomes more equal over time (see
Figure 4 below).16 The same applies for the distribution of current incomes.
Figure 4 here
The intuition is as follows. During the transition towards the steady state, the accumulated
wealth, (1 + rt)Kt, grows on average faster than the non-accumulated wealth, Ht. At the
same time, aggregate consumption of workers and capitalist grow pari passu (see Euler equa-
tion). Given the workers’ and the entrepreneurs’ optimal consumption rules (12) and (14),
respectively, this is only possible if the workers’ share in aggregate capital increases over time.
16A similar result in a neoclassical setting has already been obtained by Stiglitz (1969) using an ad hoc
consumption function. The equalizing force in the Solow-type model, though, is a diﬀerent one. Convergence
is due to a rising wage rate during the transition to the steady state and a due to a negative propensity to
consume out of accumulated wealth in the steady state.
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4.2 Comparative Dynamics and Welfare
We first derive the comparative-dynamic results. In a second step, these results are used to
asses the welfare implications of poor creditor protection.
Comparative dynamics. An immediate implication of Lemma (1) is that imperfect
creditor protection has no impact whatsoever if λ is relatively high. More precisely, if λ
exceeds κ∗1
³ bK0,κ0´ and the workers stick to their first-best consumption level at date 0, κ
can grow towards κ∗1 without inducing a spread in the rate of return at future dates (see Figure
5, ”high” λ). Consequently, the workers do not deviate from their first-best behavior at any
point in time (and the capitalists do not deviate either). But this means that the dynamics
towards the steady state does not diﬀer from the dynamics that would prevail in the first-best
economy.
Figure 5 here
In what follows we concentrate on an economy with relatively low creditor protection so that
κ∗1 > λ (see Figure 5, ”low” λ). In this situation, poor creditor protection is shown to have a
(large) impact on how the economy evolves over time. The starting point of the analysis is to
show that aggregate consumption will be higher (as compared to the benchmark economy) at
early stages of development.
Lemma 2 Let κ∗1
³ bK0,κ0´ > λ. Then, bC0 is strictly higher under imperfect credit. Hence,bK1 must be smaller in the imperfect economy.
Proof. Suppose first that bC0 is strictly lower under imperfect credit. According to equation
(15), this can only be true if bH0 is strictly lower than in the first-best economy case. Then,
since bK0 is exogenous, bK1 must be higher under imperfect credit (equation 18). Accordingly,
rL1 will be lower and bw1 will be higher (both in a strict sense) than in the first-best economy
case (equations 6 and 8). Since bw0 is the same in both situations and rL1 is strictly lower under
imperfect credit it follows from equation (17) that bH1 must be strictly lower (as compared to
the first-best economy case). Therefore, we may infer that bK2 is higher and, consequently, that
rL2 ( bw2) is lower (higher) than in the benchmark economy. Very similar to the step before,
it must then be that bH2 is strictly lower under imperfect credit. We may now repeat these
arguments ad infinitum and conclude that, under the premise made above, the capital stock
under imperfect credit must be strictly higher at all future dates t > 0. Since a higher stock of
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capital is associated with a lower worker’s rate of return and a higher wage rate, bH0 must be
strictly higher as well (equation 16). But this contradicts our initial assumption.
Suppose now that bC0 is the same under perfect and imperfect credit implying that also bH0
is the same in both situations. Suppose further that κ0 < λ. Then, the two economies must
evolve completely parallel until κ reaches λ. From Lemma (1) and the assumption κ∗1 > λ we
know that κ must cross the λ-threshold at some point in time. Suppose that this happens for
the first time in t = τ , i.e., κτ > λ and κt ≤ λ ∀t < τ . Again, it is important to note that
before τ both bH and bK (as well as the worker’s rate of return and the wage rate) do not diﬀer
from their first-best economy counterparts and this is even true for bKτ . But since rLτ is strictly
lower under imperfect credit than under perfect credit, bH is (for the first time) strictly lower
under imperfect credit in τ . We can now use the same arguments as in the first part of the
proof in order to end with the contradiction that bH0 must be strictly higher under imperfect
credit. In case of κ0 ≥ λ this second part of the proof can be carried out in a similar way.
Having led the assumption that bC0 is smaller (or the same) under imperfect credit to a
contradiction, we conclude that bC0 must be strictly higher in the imperfect economy. This, in
turn, implies that bK1 is smaller.
Lemma (2) shows that poor creditor protection is reflected in a low savings rate out of
aggregate income at date 0. The reason is that low returns to accumulated wealth, either right
from the beginning if κ0 > λ or somewhere in the future if κ0 ≤ λ, deteriorate the workers’
incentives to save. More precisely, the credit market imperfection alters, all other things equal,
the sequence of interest rates rL1 , r
L
2 , r
L
3 , · · ·, in a way that must increase the present value of
labor income at date 0. The latter, in turn, determines (together with the accumulated wealth)
current consumption. Hence, in case of κ0 ≤ λ, workers’ initial consumption is increased
(as compared to the benchmark economy) while the entrepreneurs do not deviate from their
benchmark level. Obviously then, bC0 is higher under imperfect credit. In this context it is worth
pointing out that imperfect enforcement of credit contracts may alter individual behavior long
before the symptom of the imperfection, i.e., the spread in the return to capital, appears for the
first time. Otherwise, if κ0 > λ and therefore rL0 < r
E
0 , workers’ consumption may be higher
or lower than in the benchmark economy (because of their lower current capital income) while
entrepreneurs’ initial consumption is higher for sure. The net eﬀect on aggregate consumption,
however, has to be positive.
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We are now ready to compare the speed of accumulation under perfect and imperfect credit,
respectively, and to discuss the welfare implications of poor creditor protection. We already
know from Lemma (2) that, under imperfect credit, the aggregate stock of capital is strictly
lower at date 1 due to the higher present value of labor income at date 0. Moreover, it can
now be shown that bK is always lower under imperfect credit. To see this, suppose, to the
contrary, that at some date, say τ + 1, bK is for the first time strictly higher in the imperfect
economy than in the benchmark economy, i.e., suppose that bKτ+1 is strictly higher and thatbKt is lower or equal for all t ≤ τ . Then, rLτ+1 must be strictly smaller in the former case
(equation 6). So, for bKτ+1 to be strictly higher under imperfect credit, bHτ+1 must be strictly
lower (equation 18’) such that, again, bKτ+2 is strictly higher with imperfect credit markets
(equation 18). This, in turn, implies that bHτ+2 is smaller under imperfect credit which leads
to a higher bKτ+3, and so on. Hence, from τ +1 onwards, the interest rate relevant for workers
will be strictly lower (as compared to the first-best world) and the wage rate will be strictly
higher. But this means that bHτ+1 must be strictly higher under imperfect credit (equation
16) which is a contradiction. The assumption that the capital stocks are equal under perfect
and imperfect credit at some points in time can be led to a contradiction in a similar way.
Further, since the benchmark economy monotonically converges to bK∗, we also have bKt < bK∗,
t ≥ 0, in an economy with an imperfect credit market. These results are stated in the following
proposition (proof in the text).
Proposition 1 Let κ∗1
³ bK0,κ0´ > λ. Then, bKt is strictly lower under imperfect credit for all
t > 0. Hence, bKt < bK∗ for all t ≥ 0.
An immediate implication is that the workers’ share in aggregate capital, κt, is strictly
lower under imperfect credit for all t > 0. From Proposition (1) and equation (7), it follows
directly that, under imperfect credit, rEt is strictly higher at all future dates t > 0 no matter
whether there is a spread in the rate of return (κt > λ) or not (κt ≤ λ). Moreover, rE0 is equal
or higher under imperfect credit. Consequently, the entrepreneurs’ aggregate capital stock,
KE, is equal or higher at date 1 and strictly higher (as compared to the perfect economy
benchmark) at any date t > 1 (equation 14). Since KEt /Kt = (1 − κt) and by Proposition
(1), our claim follows. The fact that the workers accumulate less has also implications for the
ratio aggregate amount of credit divided by aggregate output (KLt /Yt), an in the empirical
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literature widely used measure for ”financial development.” According to this measure, the
model predicts that ”financial development” is lower with imperfect creditor protection since
the workers, excluded from entrepreneurial activities by assumption, are the creditors in this
economy. To summarize (proof in the text),
Proposition 2 Let κ∗1
³ bK0,κ0´ > λ. Then, both κt and the ratio KLt /Yt are strictly smaller
for all t > 0 under imperfect credit.
So, given that the initial distribution of capital is suﬃciently uneven in the sense that the
economic elite possesses a disproportionate part of the aggregate capital stock, the distribution
of accumulated wealth between workers and entrepreneurs (and also the distribution of current
income) is always more unequal under imperfect credit (as compared to the first-best economy).
According to the present model, poor creditor protection in an oligarchic society ensures that
capital remains concentrated (or becomes even stronger concentrated) in the hands of those
who may invest. Knowing this, it is interesting to ask whether the workers’ incentives to save
are still strong enough to push κ beyond λ in case of κ0 < λ.
Proposition 3 Let κ∗1
³ bK0,κ0´ > λ. Then, whenever κ is below λ, it must be strictly higher
at least at one date in the future.
Proof. Suppose first that κ0 < λ. By Lemma (2) and equation (15), both bC0 and bH0
must be strictly higher under imperfect credit. Suppose now that κt ≤ λ for all t ≥ 0. Then,
along the lines of the proof of Lemma (2), it can be shown that bKt will be smaller than in the
perfect economy at all dates t > 0. Consequently, for all t > 0, rLt (wt) must be strictly higher
(strictly lower) under imperfect credit (equations 6 and 8). But this translates into a smallerbH0 (equation 16) which contradicts Lemma (2). Hence, κ must pass λ from below at some
future date. Suppose now that κ reaches (or falls below) λ from above at some date τ+1. From
Lemma (1) we know that κ∗1
³ bKτ ,κτ´ > λ. Hence, by Lemma (2) and equation (15), both bCτ
and bHτ must be strictly higher than in a perfect economy that starts with bKτ and κτ . Then,
using the same arguments as above, κ must pass λ from below at some later date again.
Proposition (3) can be understood as follows. According to Lemma (2), the present value
of aggregate labor income, bH0, must be higher under imperfect credit while Proposition (1)
implies that, at any point in time, the wages (the marginal product of capital) are comparatively
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low (high) so that bH0 tends to be low. Proposition (3) states now that a slower accumulation
and a higher present value of labor income can only go together when, some time, the workers
discount future labor income with less than the marginal product of capital. Hence, there
must be at least one period in which the workers’ share in aggregate capital exceeds λ. But
not only that. Every time when κ falls below λ later on, it has to exceed this threshold again
in the future. Note that this latter observation allows us to compare the growth rate of the
imperfect economy in each period t with the growth rate that would prevail in a hypothetical
first-best economy with κt and bKt. It implies that, whatever values the state variables κt andbKt will take in the imperfect economy, such a first-best economy would converge to a steady
state level of κ lying above λ. Formally, we have κ∗1
³ bKt,κt´ > λ, t > 0. But then, by Lemma
(2), the growth rate of imperfect economy is lower in any period t than the growth rate of the
hypothetical first-best economy.
Welfare implications. The comparative-dynamic results allow us to make clear-cut wel-
fare predictions. In particular, we can use them to prove another important result of the
present paper, namely that the entrepreneurs are better oﬀ with imperfect contract enforce-
ment. We already know that the entrepreneurial rate of return, rEt , t > 0, is strictly higher
under imperfect credit. Hence, according to the Euler equation, the capitalists must be on
a steeper consumption path as compared to the benchmark economy. Finally, since the cap-
italists’ initial consumption level is equal to (in case of κ0 ≤ λ) or higher than (in case of
κ0 > λ) the benchmark level, they consume strictly more in each period t > 0 so that their
lifetime utility (9) rises. Conversely, since the outcome in the first-best economy is on the
utility possibility frontier, the workers must be worse oﬀ. To summarize (proof in the text),
Proposition 4 Let κ∗1
³ bK0,κ0´ > λ. Then, the entrepreneurs are strictly better oﬀ under
imperfect credit. In contrast, the workers lose.
The intuition behind the above proposition involves two key elements. First, poor cred-
itor protection reduces the workers’ incentives to save - resulting in a slower pace of capital
accumulation. A lower aggregate capital stock at all future dates, in turn, means that the
marginal product of capital is higher at any point in time. Since the entrepreneurs derive in-
come solely from employing capital, they experience (as compared to the benchmark economy)
a higher income in each period. Put diﬀerently, the entrepreneurs benefit because the factor
25
from which they derive their income is relatively scarce at each point in time. Second, even
though the workers accumulate less, κ has to exceed λ at some points in time if it is below
this threshold when the economy starts. Hence, at least at some dates, the borrowing rate lies
below the marginal product of capital. Low borrowing rates, in turn, are associated with an
entrepreneurial rate of return the above marginal product of capital. Again, the entrepreneurs
must benefit. The workers are worse oﬀ for the same two reasons. First, a slower pace of
capital accumulation means that the marginal product of labor and hence the wages are lower
at all future dates t > 0. Second, at least at some dates, the workers’ return to capital is lower
than the marginal product of capital.
In Subsection 4.4, the model is calibrated to get an intuition to what an extent the en-
trepreneurs win. In addition, the calibration exercise provides evidence that the gains mono-
tonically decrease in λ.
4.3 Convergence and the Steady State
We now consider whether there is a steady state in an economy with imperfect contract en-
forcement and, if so, whether such an economy converges to its balanced growth path.
Let’s turn to the existence of a steady state first. From above, we know that the first-best
economy is on the balanced growth path if the aggregate capital stock (in eﬃciency units)
equals bK∗. In addition, it has been mentioned that the distribution of aggregate capital is
constant under balanced growth. From this, it follows directly that in case of λ < 1 any
combination of state variables
³ bK∗,κ´, κ ∈ [0,λ], is consistent with steady state growth since,
for these values, we have rL = rE = r∗. Therefore, the dynamics of the imperfect economy
does not diﬀer from that in the first-best economy. In particular, κ is a constant so that poor
creditor protection may never play a role.
It remains to prove convergence. As in the previous subsection, we concentrate on the
interesting case where λ < κ∗1
³ bK0,κ0´ . The first step is to show that, also in this case, the
aggregate capital stock monotonically increases over time.
Lemma 3 Let 1 + rL0 ≥ (1 + ρ)(1 + g). Then, bKt+1 > bKt for all t ≥ 0.
Proof. To see that aggregate savings are strictly positive in t = 0, assume, to the contrary,
that bK1 ≤ bK0. Since bKE1 > bKE0 , we have bKL1 < bKL0 and therefore κ1 < κ0, implying that
1+rL1 > 1+r
L
0 ≥ (1+ρ)(1+gB). Hence, according to the Euler equation, bCL must rise between
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the dates 0 and 1. Likewise, we have bCE1 > bCE0 and therefore bC1 > bC0. Then, by equation
(15), bH1 > bH0. Finally, it fallows from equation (18) that bK2 < bK1 ≤ bK0. This sequence of
steps can be repeated to see that bKL will eventually reach zero. At that point, however, the
workers can no longer follow the Euler equation since they may not borrow. Because such a
path cannot be optimal, aggregate savings must be strictly positive in t = 0: bK1 > bK0.
Suppose now that bKt > bKt−1 and bKt+1 ≤ bKt with t > 0. Using the same arguments as
above, we have rLt+1 > r
L
t . Then, by equation (18’), bHt+1 > bHt. Further, equation (18) implies
that bKt+2 < bKt+1 ≤ bKt. But then, rLt+2 must be strictly higher than rLt+1 and, according to
equation (17), bH must rise again between t + 1 and t + 2 so that bKt+3 < bKt+2, and so on.
Again, such a path cannot be optimal, and we conclude that bKt+1 > bKt, t ≥ 0.
Lemma (3) states that the individuals’ optimal consumption decisions will never give rise
to negative aggregate savings. The intuition is the same as in the first-best economy. Negative
aggregate savings in t are associated with a higher return to capital in t+ 1. Since the Euler
equation determines the extent of consumption growth, aggregate consumption will expand
strongly between the two periods so that aggregate savings are even lower in t + 1. This, in
turn, leads to a strong expansion of consumption between t+1 and t+2, and so on. Eventually,
the economy would collapse if the individuals followed such a consumption path.
So far, we know that even with an imperfect credit market the aggregate capital stock
monotonically increases (Lemma 3) but may never exceed bK∗ (Proposition 1). Suppose now
that bK does not converge to bK∗ but to a level that lies strictly below bK∗. Then, by equation
(7), we have 1 + rEt > 1 + r
∗ = (1 + ρ)(1 + g) for all t ≥ 0. Consequently, since
bKEt+1 = 1 + rEt(1 + ρ)(1 + g). bKEt ,
it must be the case that bKE grows towards infinity. This, in turn, requires bKL to become
negative from some point in time onwards which is impossible since the workers may not
borrow.17 Hence, the sequence
n bKto
t≥0
must converge to bK∗. Then, by the equations (18)
and (15), we have lim
t→∞
bHt = 1+ρρ bw∗ = bH∗ and limt→∞ bCt = bC∗, respectively. To summarize (proof
in the text),
17Note, however, that even if the workers were allowed to borrow, bK could not converge to a value below bK∗.
The reason is that bC would grow towards infinity.
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Proposition 5 Let λ < κ∗1
³ bK0,κ0´. Then, the sequences n bKto
t≥0
and
n bCto
t≥0
converge
to their first-best steady state values bK∗ and bC∗.
It remains to determine the limit behaviour of κt. Obviously, this ratio may not converge
to a value on the interval (λ, 1] since then the entrepreneurs’ rate of return would converge to
a level that is strictly higher than r∗ = (1 + ρ)(1 + g) − 1. Again, the entrepreneurs’ stock of
capital would grow towards infinity under such circumstances. Note further that κt does not
converge to a value on the interval [0,λ) either. Proposition (3) states that - whenever κ lies
below λ - it has to exceed λ in the future. The following proposition states that κt exactly
converges to λ.
Proposition 6 Let λ < κ∗1
³ bK0,κ0´. Then, the sequence {κt}t≥0 converges to λ.
Proof. By the Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem, the sequence {κt}t≥0 has a convergent sub-
sequence. We start the proof by showing that any convergent subsequence of {κt}t≥0 has to
converge to λ. Notice first that one can rule out that a subsequence converges to a value on
the interval (λ, 1] based on the same argumentation as above. Suppose now that there exists a
subsequence
©
κtj
ª
j≥0 that converges to a value on the interval [0,λ), i.e., suppose without loss
of generality that lim
j→∞
κtj = λ − ς with ς > 0. Then, there must be a η ∈ (0, ς) so that there
exists a ej with ¯¯λ− κtj ¯¯ > η for all j ≥ ej. Consequently, by Proposition 3, we know that κ
has to increase infinitely often by an amount larger than η > 0 so that, since both bKE and bK
monotonically rise over time, bK must grow towards infinity. But this contradicts Proposition
5. We conclude that any convergent subsequence of {κt}t≥0 converges to λ.
Suppose now that the sequence {κt}t≥0 does not converge to λ. Then, there must be a ε > 0
so that for all t there exists a m(t) ≥ t with
¯¯
λ− κm(t)
¯¯
≥ ε. Consider the sequence
©
κm(t)
ª
t≥0 .
This sequence is also contained in the closed and bounded interval [0, 1], and hence must have a
convergent subsequence. This convergent subsequence, since it is also a subsequence of {κt}t≥0 ,
must converge to λ. But this contradicts the inequality
¯¯
λ− κm(t)
¯¯
≥ ε. Therefore, we have
lim
t→∞
κt = λ.
While the credit market imperfection does not prevent the aggregate variables to converge
to their corresponding first-best values, poor creditor protection has a large impact on the long-
run distribution of aggregate wealth, income, and consumption. The second result can easily
be understood from the discussion in Subsection (4.2). The less the lenders are protected
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from expropriation, the lower the incentives to save and, as a consequence, the smaller the
fraction of aggregate wealth they eventually own. But why does the aggregate capital stock
converge to its first-best level? Clearly, it may never exceed the first-best economy’s steady
state value because, for a given capital stock, aggregate savings are lower with imperfect
creditor protection. On the other hand, only convergence to the first-best level makes sure
that, eventually, the Euler equation induces aggregate consumption to grow pari passu with
productivity so that the optimal consumption rules can be applied ad infinitum. Hence, the
aggregate capital stock grows towards bK∗ also with λ < κ∗1 ³ bK0,κ0´, yet at a slower pace.
4.4 Simulation
We now calibrate the model in order to assess the quantitative implications of imperfect credit.
In particular, we are interested in the welfare gains of the oligarchic elite.
The baseline model is calibrated as follows. The parameters take the usual values, namely
α = 0.33, ρ = 0.05, and g = 0.03. This choice implies steady state values of the capital stock
(divided by the index of the state of technology) and the interest rate of bK∗ = 8.06 and
r∗ = 0.0815, respectively. Since we are interested in policy making in relatively poor countries,
we choose a low initial aggregate capital endowment: bK0 = 0.5. With respect to the initial
distribution of income we assume that the workers own 20 % of the initial capital stock (κ0)
and represent 95 % of the population (θ = 0.95). Under the premise that there is no inequality
within the two classes, these assumptions give rise to an income-based Gini coeﬃcient (in t = 0)
of 0.215. Of course, the Gini would be (considerably) higher if we assumed also within-class
inequality. However, as far as the dynamics of the aggregate variables is concerned, within-class
inequality does not play a role and we simply abstract from this issue.
Figure 6 shows the behavior of κ in the benchmark economy (λ = 1) and under imperfect
credit, namely in case of λ = 0.5 and λ = 0.2. The steady state value of κ under perfect credit,
κ∗1, can be numerically computed as 0.71. As shown above, the corresponding values under
imperfect credit are given by κ∗0.5 = 0.5 and κ∗0.2 = 0.2, respectively.
Figure 6 here
It is clear from Proposition (4) that a representative entrepreneur’s utility must be higher
under imperfect credit. Moreover, when we look at Figure 2, it comes not as a surprise that
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the increase in utility is higher in the λ = 0.2-case. Numerical computation shows that the
entrepreneurs experience a 20 %-increase in utility if λ = 0.5 and an increase of 48 % if λ = 0.2
(as compared to the benchmark case). This monotonicity seems not to depend on the initial
conditions chosen here. In all the calibrations we have done the entrepreneurs’ utility decreases
in λ.
In all the calculations so far we assumed that A grows with 3 % irrespective of whether
the economy is perfect or not. However, there are good reasons to believe that the imperfect
economy - suﬀering from poor creditor protection and barriers to entry - grows at a lower
rate. One reason might be talent mismatch. If the property rights on firms (and also the
management) are passed down from generations to generation and if there are substantial
barriers to entry there is little hope that the firms operating in this sector are managed by
the most talented. But this type of dynastic management is particularly widespread in poorer
economies with a bad contractual infrastructure (e.g., Caselli and Gennaioli, 2002). We are
now interested in whether the capitalists will still lobby in favor of entry barriers and poor
creditor protection if this policy mix leads to a lower growth rate. More precisely, we ask
how much growth the capitalists are willing to sacrifice in order to have a λ of 0.5 or 0.2. To
avoid a time-consistency problem it is simply assumed that the policy mix is determined in
t = 0 once and for all. Numerical computation shows that the entrepreneurs would accept a
decrease in the growth rate of A of up to 1.8 percentage points in order to have λ = 0.5. The
corresponding number for λ = 0.2 is 4.6 percentage points. So, the capitalists prefer to live
in an economy with zero or even negative long-run growth if the income distribution changes
significantly in their favor during the transition towards the steady state.
5 Conclusions
This paper introduces imperfect credit contract enforcement and a restriction on occupational
choice into the standard Ramsey growth model. In particular, it is assumed that only a small
economic elite, the oligarchs, may undertake significant capital investments and that these
members of the elite, when borrowing from the rest of the society, may renege on the debt con-
tracts at low cost. We show that in such an oligarchic society poor contract enforcement slows
down the transition towards the steady state and alters the dynamics of the asset distribution
strongly in favor of the established entrepreneurs.
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The reason is that the non-entrepreneurs, lacking an alternative use for their savings,
are forced to charge ”low” borrowing rates in order to give the incumbents weaker incen-
tives to default. With dynastic preferences, low returns to accumulation deteriorate the non-
entrepreneurs’, i.e., the workers’, incentives to save. They discount their future labor income
less and, as a consequence, consume more out of current income. Moreover, their current
(capital) income is, other things equal, smaller which reinforces the eﬀect operating via the
present value of future wages. Access to cheap credit, in turn, is associated with a ”high”
entrepreneurial rate of return. Even though the oligarchs are induced to save more through
this channel, the net eﬀect of poor creditor protection on aggregate savings is negative.
The present paper goes beyond the existing literature in two respects. First, it analyzes
the impact of an imperfect credit market on aggregate accumulation and the dynamics of the
distribution when individuals have dynastic preferences; it describes a mechanism that is by
construction absent if parents derive utility directly from bequeathing to their children or if
the interest rate is exogenous. Second, the paper emphasizes that poor creditor protection
- although detrimental to financial development and growth - produces winners if there are
significant barriers to entrepreneurship. Calibrations of the model suggest that the elite’s
welfare gains are substantial; a representative oligarch would not only be willing to accept a
slower transition to the steady state but also significantly lower productivity growth rates in
exchange for poor creditor protection and barriers to entrepreneurship.
The existence of asymmetric distributional consequences suggests that there may be po-
litical forces behind low financial development. Perhaps, creditor protection is bad neither
because a poor country cannot aﬀord better contract enforcement nor because it is ignored
that contract enforcement is important; the reason may simply be that it is not in the interest
of the politically powerful to have a better working credit market. We find some empirical
evidence pointing into this direction. Creditor protection is particularly bad when there are
substantial barriers to entrepreneurship and, as a result, the model predicts strong distributive
consequences.
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